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Abstract
Machine learning as a service (MLaaS), and algorithm mar-
ketplaces are on a rise. Data holders can easily train com-
plex models on their data using third party provided learning
codes. Training accurate ML models requires massive labeled
data and advanced learning algorithms. The resulting models
are considered as intellectual property of the model owners
and their copyright should be protected. Also, MLaaS needs
to be trusted not to embed secret information about the train-
ing data into the model, such that it could be later retrieved
when the model is deployed.
In this paper, we present membership encoding for training
deep neural networks and encoding the membership informa-
tion, i.e. whether a data point is used for training, for a sub-
set of training data. Membership encoding has several appli-
cations in different scenarios, including robust watermarking
for model copyright protection, and also the risk analysis of
stealthy data embedding privacy attacks. Our encoding algo-
rithm can determine the membership of significantly redacted
data points, and is also robust to model compression and fine-
tuning. It also enables encoding a significant fraction of the
training set, with negligible drop in the model’s prediction
accuracy.
Introduction
A major concern with respect to algorithm marketplaces and
machine learning platforms is with respect to protecting the
copyright of models (Adi et al. 2018; Chen, Rohani, and
Koushanfar 2018; Rouhani, Chen, and Koushanfar 2018;
Uchida et al. 2017). The challenging problem is to embed
some watermark into the model which is robust to changes,
and is detectable with high confidence if a secret key is
known.
Another concern is that machine learning models can leak
information about the members of their training data (Shokri
et al. 2017). The threat is, however, beyond passive inference
attacks. A malicious training code can enable an attacker to
turn the trained model into a covert channel (Song, Risten-
part, and Shmatikov 2017). A model which is trained using
a malicious code could lead to the leakage of sensitive infor-
mation about its training data, when deployed.
In both cases, the objective is to stealthily embed infor-
mation in the model that can be recovered only if an en-
tity knows the decoding secret. The underlying techniques
and objectives of encoding attacks are very similar, but the
trust models are different. Existing embedding algorithms,
exploit the unused capacity of deep neural networks (Arpit
et al. 2017), and embed secret information by overfitting the
models on encoded secrets, or writing them on the model
parameters. To this end, a large number of poisoned train-
ing data (approximately 4, 000 data records (Song, Risten-
part, and Shmatikov 2017)) needs to be embedded into such
models, and a large number of parameters are modified by
the algorithm. These limit the scalability of the embedding
algorithms, as they quickly run into a conflict with the ac-
curacy of the model. They also become very fragile with
respect to changes in the model (as particular parameters in
the model are responsible for an embedding, and removing
them would remove the embedded information).
Our contributions. In this paper, we introduce membership
encoding for deep learning, which could be either used for
watermarking a model to test its ownership, or for privacy
attacks when training code is supplied by the adversary. For
the latter case, it could also be used to analyze the suscepti-
bility of a model to covert channel attacks. In our algorithm,
during the training, a subset of the training data is selected to
be encoded. The selection can be based on a sensitive crite-
ria (e.g., cancer patient records) in the scenario of privacy at-
tacks. Then, we develop an algorithm which encodes (1 bit)
membership information of the selected data records into the
model based on a secret key. After the model is trained, one
can decode the encoded membership information from the
model, only if he has the secret key.
To perform encoding, we design a membership encod-
ing network, where a membership discriminator model is
trained along with the target model. We optimize the model’s
main objective function, and the discriminator’s objective si-
multaneously. This leads to finding a membership discrim-
inator and a classification model that jointly maximize the
accuracy of membership inference, and yet preserves the
prediction accuracy of the model. The discriminator, which
simulates the membership inference, plays a very important
role. It forces the model to learn distinguishable representa-
tions (in the model’s hidden layers or output) for the targeted
subset of the training data, compare to other data.
We evaluate membership encoding on several deep learn-
ing benchmark datasets and models: MNIST, CIFAR10, Pur-
chase and Texas Hospital datasets, with MLP, CNN, and
ResNet models. Our results show that our encoding al-
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gorithm can successfully train a model with high test
accuracy and yet infer membership information accu-
rately for a substantial subset of the training data. We test
our membership encoding algorithm in scenarios where the
trained model is released (white-box access) as well as when
it is accessible via prediction API (black-box access). For
example, in the white-box case, membership encoding can
achieve 0.97 precision on the Texas Hospital dataset with
20% (10, 000 records) of the training data being encoded.
The model’s test accuracy remains as high as 97.82%, which
is the same as model trained without membership encod-
ing. On CIFAR10 ResNet model, the encoding accuracy is
0.96, while test accuracy is 91.85% (with 0.25% accuracy
drop compared to the baseline). In the black-box case, mem-
bership encoding can achieve 0.85 precision (compared to
0.87 in the white-box setting) on 20% of MNIST images
with model’s test accuracy drop 1.1% (compared to 0%
drop in the white-box setting). To put this in perspective,
note that the encoding membership for MNIST is extremely
hard as the digits images in one class are visually very sim-
ilar, and membership inference attacks perform poorly on
MNIST (Shokri et al. 2017).
We also show that our encoding algorithm is robust to
input and model modifications, such as input redaction,
parameter pruning, and model fine-tuning. We examine
encoding performance on CIFAR10 when part of the input
image is masked with 0. Our white-box attack can achieve
0.88 precision even when the center 8 × 8 part (which is
the most important part) of a 32 × 32 image is removed.
We also evaluate the cases where the trained model is trans-
formed using pruning or fine-tuning techniques, which are
common practice in ML to reduce the model size and for
transfer learning. Our results show that the membership in-
ference is accurate as long as the model is not transformed
too much to the extent of damaging its own test accuracy. We
further develop an adversarial pruning algorithm that signif-
icantly preserves the membership information in the trained
model even when 70% of the model parameters are removed.
Background and Notations
We denote machine learning model as a function fθ : X 7→
Y , where X is the input (feature) space, Y is the output
space, and θ are its parameters. We focus on classification
models, where X is a q-dimensional vector space and Y is
a discrete set of classes. The model outputs argmaxfθ(x)
as the predicted class label. The training data is denoted as
D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 with features xi and class label yi.
We denote deep learning model f as layers of non-linear
transformations [hθ1 , . . . , hθl ]. The activations at layer j is
computed as aj = hθj ◦ hθj−1 ◦ · · · ◦ h1(x). The parameters
θ = {θ1 . . . θl} describe the weights used for all l layers of
transformation.
Membership inference attacks
Membership inference attacks (MIA) aim to determine
whether a target data record is in dataset D, when the
adversary can observe some computation (e.g., aggregate
statistics, machine learning model) over D. Prior work per-
formed membership inference on aggregate statistics, e.g.,
in the context of genomic studies (Homer et al. 2008;
Backes et al. 2016), location time-series (Pyrgelis, Tron-
coso, and De Cristofaro 2018), or noisy statistics in gen-
eral (Dwork et al. 2015). Previous MIA against machine
learning model focuses on black-box setting, where the ad-
versary can query the model and observe the output predic-
tion probability for a target record (x, y) and then decide
whether (x, y) ∈ D (Shokri et al. 2017). Shokri et al pro-
posed a method to learn the statistical difference between
outputs of members and nonmembers by training a member-
ship discriminator using the model output probability vector
as the attack feature vector.
Membership Encoding
The goal of membership encoding is to encode a one-bit
membership information for a substantial selected subset of
training data into a ML model during training. After the
model is trained, the encoded membership information for
the selected set can be extracted by querying the model.
The quality of the membership encoding is measured as how
accurately can one extract the membership information for
encoded records. Membership encoding has several appli-
cations including copyright protection watermarking of the
ML model and training data privacy attacks.
Membership encoding for watermarking
We assume model owner trains a watermarked model locally
and deploy the model in a trusted third-party ML service
provider. The ML service provider uses a secret key s pro-
vided by the model owner for verification of model owner-
ship. Model owner encodes the membership information for
a selected set of data records using membership encoding
during training using secret key s. The membership informa-
tion of this particular set is the watermark. When a user de-
mands to claim the model ownership, he passes a secret key
to the ML service provider, who then uses this key to per-
form membership inference on user provided records. Only
when there are enough encoded data records being correctly
decoded as member can one claim ownership.
Adversary in this case aims to pass the verification and
steal the model. Passing the verification requires the adver-
sary to know: (1) the exact encoded training records and (2)
the secrets s to extract the membership information on en-
coded records . Thus, even for adversary who has knowl-
edge about the selected training records, faking a watermark
is highly unlikely as adversary has no information about the
secret s.
Membership encoding for privacy attacks
On a machine learning platform, the client provides the data,
and we assume a third-party as the adversary provides the
program to train a machine learning model, following the
setting in (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). The ma-
chine learning program has full access to the client’s data
during the training, while the adversary cannot exfiltrate the
data during training as the platform is secure and isolated.
The only outcome of the process is the model, which is
owned by the client. After training, the client might allow
Symbol Meaning
DC Client’s training records
DC-m A subset of DC to be encoded as member
DC-nm DC/DC-m, encoded as nonmember
DA Auxiliary random inputs
DA-m A subset of DA to be encoded as member
DA-nm DA/DA-m, encoded as nonmember
Dtest Hold-out test dataset
Table 1: List of notations on dataset
public access to it via an application or a machine-learning-
as-a-service platform (black-box release). Client might also
share or sell the whole model (white-box release). We as-
sume the adversary can get access to the model at this stage.
In the white-box case, adversary has access to the model pa-
rameters, and in the black-box case, adversary can only send
inputs and obtain the model predictions on them.
A direct privacy attack of membership encoding is mem-
bership inference attacks. Adversary uses the model as a
covert channel to encode membership of training data dur-
ing training and decode it when the model becomes publicly
available. Adversary might be interested in encoding train-
ing data that have a particular sensitive value, e.g., patients
with HIV+. In the inference phase, adversary tries to deter-
mine the membership of some target data records, that are
(partially) available, thus inferring the missing sensitive at-
tributes.
Overview of membership encoding algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents membership encoding. The goal is to
create a distinguishable representation of the client’s training
data in the model during the training, such that the attacker
can infer their membership when the model is released.
Membership encoding algorithm optimizes classifier f for
encoding the membership of a subset DC-m of its training
set, while also minimizing the classification loss (minθ Lce
overDC). A discriminator d is trained, along side the model,
to encode membership information into the model predic-
tions or its activation functions. The joint optimization for
membership encoding is minθ,φ Lenc, where the objective is
to separate the representations of DC-m ∪ DA-m from that of
DC-nm ∪ DA-nm. The generated synthetic datasets DA-m and
DA-nm have different distributions and help separating DC-m
fromDC-nm, thus encoding the membership ofDC-m. We use
gradient descent to solve the optimization problems and up-
date the parameters.
In detail, membership encoding has two phases: encoding
phase, and inference phase.
Encoding phase
Selecting encoded data. For membership encoding to be
used as privacy attack, we assume adversary provides the
malicious algorithm which has access to the training data.
The adversary targets a subset of the training data, that
might have common sensitive attributes, to secretly embed
into the model. Adversary selects a subset DC-m from the
client dataset DC to be the data we want to encode as mem-
ber. Let DC-nm be the remaining subset of the training set,
DC-nm = DC \ DC-m. After the malicious training is over,
and the client publishes the model, the attacker runs a mem-
bership (decoding) inference attack to confidently decide
whether a record is in DC-m or not.
For watermarking, model owner can randomly sample a
subset of training data as DC-m. At verification time, only
this subset will be useful for claiming model’s ownership.
Generating synthetic data. Membership encoding uses
synthetic data points to guide training the discriminator dur-
ing the membership encoding phase. The exact same data
is re-generated during the inference phase to reconstruct the
discriminator. The synthetic data is composed of two dis-
joint sets DA-m,DA-nm that are generated from two differ-
ent distributions. They are used to force the classification
model to learn distinguishable representations for the DC-m
and DC-nm, which are similar to the synthetic datasets DA-m
and DA-nm, respectively.
The generation of synthetic data is outlined in function
GenSyntheticData in Algorithm 1. The generation pro-
cess is deterministic based on a secret seed s. The func-
tion first generates two mean vectors µm, µnm from uniform
distribution. Then, two clusters of feature vectors are sam-
pled from two multivariate Gaussian distributions with the
two uniform mean vectors and identity covariance matrix.
This procedure creates natural separation between DA-m and
DA-nm, making the internal features learned by the model
easier to distinguish between member and nonmember.
Membership discriminator. To enforce separating the rep-
resentations of member and nonmember data, a member-
ship discriminator is augmented with the main classification
model. The membership discriminator dφ with parameter φ
is a binary classifier that takes the internal activations (hid-
den layer) or the output of the main classification model as
input and predicts their membership. We denote hθ(x) as
the set of activation units computed on x and the discrimi-
nator outputs dφ(hθ(x)) a probability value for membership
prediction, i.e.,
dφ(hθ(x)) = Pr(x ∈ DC-m ∪ DA-m;hθ(x)).
Membership encoding loss. The membership discrimina-
tor outputs label 1 for data that adversary selected to encode
as member and 0 otherwise. To train the membership dis-
criminator, the adversarial training algorithm optimizes the
membership encoding loss, which is defined as following:
Lenc(h, z) = z · log dφ(h) + (1− z) · log(1− dφ(h)),
where h = hθ(x) for input x, and z is the membership label:
1 if x ∈ Dm = DC-m ∪ DA-m and 0 if x ∈ Dnm = DC-nm ∪
DA-nm.
This loss function is used to find the jointly optimal set
of parameters for the classification model and the member-
ship discriminator. We solve the optimization problem using
stochastic gradient descent algorithm. For each mini-batch
of data sampled from Dm ∪ Dnm, we compute the gradient
of the encoding loss function with respect to θ and φ, and
update them accordingly, as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Membership encoding
Hyper-parameters: dimensions of client’s training data q, number of adversary synthesized data n, number of training iterations T , batch
size b, discriminator learning rate ηd, model learning rate ηf
function MembershipEncoding(n,DC)
Generate synthesized data DA-m,DA-nm ←GenSyntheticData(n, q)
Select DC-m and DC-nm from DC
Dm ← DC-m ∪ DA-m . data with the encoded membership, which includes the target subset of the training data
Dnm ← DC-nm ∪ DA-nm . data to be encoded as nonmember, to help distinguishing targeted members
Initialize θ, φ and select encoding activation mapping hθ . For black-box encoding, hθ = log(fθ).
for t = 1 to T do
for k steps do
Sample a mini-batch of b training data {(x1, y1) . . . (xb, yb)} from Dm ∪ Dnm.
Label each xi with zi = 1 if xi ∈ Dm and with zi = 0 otherwise.
Update classifier’s parameter θ = θ − ηd · ∇θ 1b
∑b
i=1
[
zi · log dφ(hθ(xi)) + (1− zi) · log(1− dφ(hθ(xi)))
]
Update discriminator’s parameters φ = φ− ηd · ∇φ 1b
∑b
i=1
[
zi · log dφ(hθ(xi)) + (1− zi) · log(1− dφ(hθ(xi)))
]
end for
Sample a mini-batch of b training data {(x1, y1) . . . (xb, yb)} from DC.
Update the classifier’s parameter θ = θ − ηf · ∇θ 1b
∑b
i=1
[
−∑c 1yi=c · log(fθ(xi)c)]
end for
function GenSyntheticData(n, q) . generate 2n synthetic data records of dimension q
seed(s) . seed with secrete s to ensure the generation process is deterministic
µm ∼ U(α, β)q . mean vector for member mixture
µnm ∼ U(α, β)q . mean vector for nonmember mixture
Dm = {x1, . . . , xn}, xi ∼ N (µm, Iq)
Dnm = {x′1, . . . , x′n}, xi ∼ N (µnm, Iq)
Note that the loss function for the main classification
model, which is defined as Lce(x, y) = −
∑c
i=1 1y=i ·
log(fθ(x)i), needs to be computed on the training set DC,
and optimized simultaneously with the adversary’s loss.
However, as the membership encoding loss function is com-
puted over a larger dataset which includes DA (which is es-
sentially random data), we cannot define a single loss func-
tion to solve both the optimization problems. Instead, since
we have two sources of data, we train the model and dis-
criminator alternatively: in each iteration, we first optimize
the membership encoding loss Lenc and then optimize the
main classification loss Lce. This helps finding an encoding
for the target training set, without much sacrificing the clas-
sification accuracy of the target model.
Encoding membership in the model’s output. In the appli-
cations of privacy attacks, assume the client does not publish
a white-box model after training, but rather makes it avail-
able through a black-box prediction API service. In this sce-
nario, adversary can no longer observe the intermediate rep-
resentation but only the output probability distribution for
each input.
A naive way to perform membership encoding is to use
the output probability vector directly as the feature to dis-
tinguish membership, and pass it to the discriminator. How-
ever, such encoding could significantly affect the accuracy
of the main task. This is because the output signals are lim-
ited in a small range [0, 1], and also they are directly used
for the main classification task. To solve this problem, we
propose encoding the membership in the logarithmic trans-
formation of the output probabilities, and use hθ = log(fθ).
The log of the probabilities is the logit values before the
softmax layer, up to a constant factor. The log values are
not constrained and thus provide more flexibility in encod-
ing the membership.
Inference phase
After the model is trained and the client publishes the model
(as white-box or black-box), membership discriminator if
recreated for inference the membership information.
Inference is proceed by first regenerating the synthetic
dataset that is used during training, and then querying the
target model with the synthetic data, and computing the acti-
vations (in white-box case) or output (in black-box case) us-
ing hθ. After obtaining the activations for records inDA, the
function trains a membership discriminator d′φ using these
activations and their membership labels (1 for data points in
DA-m, and 0 for data points in DA-nm).
For any target data record x, its membership probability
is computed as d′φ(hθ(x)). This information is then used for
privacy attacks or verifying model’s watermark.
Experiments
Datasets and ML models
We evaluate membership encoding on benchmark datasets,
including Purchase1, Texas hospital records (Shokri et al.
2017), MNIST and CIFAR10. We also evaluate on a variety
of deep learning models. For Purchase and Texas hospital
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-
challenge/data
Dataset f Baseline Test Enc Enc Enc
acc acc pre rec AUC
Purchase MLP 98.50% 98.12% 0.85 0.96 0.93
Texas MLP 97.85% 97.82% 0.97 0.75 0.98
MNSIT MLP 97.80% 97.75% 0.83 0.88 0.93
MNIST CNN 99.03% 99.04% 0.87 0.94 0.95
CIFAR10 VGG 90.16% 89.67% 0.92 0.98 0.98
CIFAR10 RES 92.10% 91.85% 0.83 0.98 0.96
Table 2: White-box results. Baseline accuracy is the test ac-
curacy on models trained without membership encoding and
test accuracy is for models trained with membership encod-
ing. Enc pre, rec, AUC are encoding precision, recall and
AUC respectively.
dataset, we use multi-layer perceptron (MLP). For MNIST,
we use MLP and LeNet CNN (LeCun, Bengio, and Hin-
ton 2015). For CIFAR10, we use VGG (Simonyan and Zis-
serman 2014) and ResNet (He et al. 2016). More detailed
descriptions of datasets, models and hyper-parameters are
given in supplementary materials.
For all models described above, we augment with a linear
classifier as the membership discriminator. During encod-
ing, we apply hyperbolic tangent function on the selected
activation units as in white-box case and logarithmic trans-
formation on the model output as in the black-box case be-
fore feeding to the membership discriminator. In decoding
phase, we use a one-layer MLP with 128 hidden units as the
membership discriminator in inference phase. The model is
trained with the activations units or outputs from auxiliary
synthetic data queried from the target ML model.
Evaluation metrics
For all experiments, we report the test accuracy (percent
of correctly classified test records) of the main classifica-
tion task to evaluate effects of membership encoding on the
main model performance. As for evaluating membership en-
coding, we use precision (what fraction of records inferred
as members are indeed members of the training dataset), re-
call (what fraction of the training dataset’s members are cor-
rectly inferred as members) and AUC evaluated on selected
training data and test data.
White-box encoding experiments
Membership encoding performance. Table 2 summarizes
the result. The baseline accuracy refer to the test accu-
racy trained benignly without membership encoding. On all
tasks, the models trained with membership encoding can
achieve very similar test performance in terms of the main
task, meaning these encoded models can generalize as well
as the baseline models. In the same time, the encoded mod-
els leak 20% percent of training data with high precision,
recall and AUC. This shows that deep learning models are
capable of performing multiple tasks at the same time
even though one of the tasks is to deliberately leak infor-
mation about training data.
Effects of capacity of the model. We next evaluate the re-
lationship between the capacity of the model and amount
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Figure 1: The effects of capacity of the model on test and
encoding performance evaluated on Purchase and MNIST.
The x-axis is the number of parameters in the classification
model and y-axis shows scores for the test performance and
encoding (Enc) performance.
Dataset Model Test Enc Enc Enc
acc pre rec AUC
MNIST MLP 95.38% 0.70 1.00 0.95
MNIST CNN 97.94% 0.85 1.00 0.98
CIFAR10 VGG 85.92% 0.93 0.70 0.94
Table 3: Black-box encoding result on MNIST with MLP
and CNN and CIFAR10 with VGG.
information can be encoded on Purchase with MLP and
MNIST with CNN. For purchase dataset, We vary the size of
the MLP model by increase the number of hidden units in the
first fully connected layer. We set the number of units to be
128, 192, 256, 320, 384, 448 and 512. We fix the amount of
data to be encoded as 20% of training data, which is 30,000
records. For MNIST CNN, we change the number of fil-
ters in the second convolutional layer to vary the size of the
model. We set the number of filters to be 32, 48, 64, 80, 96,
112 and 128. We set other hyper-parameters to be the same
as baseline white-box experiments.
The results are shown in Figure 1. For both Purchase and
MNIST, the test accuracy is not affected. When increasing
the capacity, the encoding performance increased slightly
on Purchase dataset while increased more drastically on CI-
FAR10 dataset. This shows that as the model capacity in-
creases, there is a point where model can achieve high per-
formance on both main task and membership encoding.
Black-box encoding experiments
We next evaluate the black-box encoding where member-
ship information is encoded in the log space of the proba-
bility output. We evaluates on MNIST with MLP and CNN
and CIFAR10 with VGG. For both experiments, we use the
log-probabilities of all 10-class output to encode the mem-
bership for 20% of training records. Other training hyper-
parameters are the same as in white-box encoding.
The results are in Table 3. The test accuracy on main
classification task drops slightly comparing to white-box en-
code. The encoding performance remains relatively high for
MNIST with CNN and CIFAR10 with VGG.
Visualization of encoded information.
To explain why our encoding mechanism works, Figure 2
visualizes the activation units and model outputs used for
encoding the membership with PCA and T-SNE projections
on CIFAR10 dataset with VGG.
In both PCA and T-SNE projections, there is a clear sep-
aration between member data DA-m,DC-m and nonmember
dataDA-nm,DC-nm. On the other hand, we can see the client’s
data DC-m,DC-nm still grouped into 10 clusters (correspond-
ing to 10 class labels) in T-SNE projections. This shows
that the hidden activations and output predictions are
learned to be separable for training and testing data and
to be class-dependent for the main task at the same time.
Robustness Analysis
Redacted input. In reality of privacy attacks, adversary may
only observe a redacted data record (e.g. only some public
available attributes for a patient’s data) for membership in-
ference. We evaluate the encoding performance where the
input images are maksed (removed) on CIFAR10 dataset.
We first consider two modes of masking : (1) the center of
the image is masked (2) the boundary part of the image is
masked but center is retained. For both masking mode, we
denote the width of masked region as w and evaluate both
white-box and black-box encoding performance with w set
to 4, 8, 12 and 16. The results are summarized in Table 4.
The white-box encoding performance is very robust against
masking when the masking area is small (w = 4 or w = 8).
The precision remains high while the recall drops more sig-
nificantly for black-box encoding.
Model pruning. The deep learning models can have mil-
lions of parameters, which makes it hard to deploy in
resource-constraint scenario (e.g. portable devices). Clients
may want to compress the model before using it. There
is a line of research on how to compress a trained large
deep learning model into smaller size (Bucilu, Caruana, and
Niculescu-Mizil 2006; Chen et al. 2015; Han et al. 2015;
Han, Mao, and Dally 2015; Howard et al. 2017). These
model compression methods could potentially destroy the
information encoded.
We consider a commonly used compression technique
called pruning (Han et al. 2015) which sparsify the model
parameters by setting the smaller weight parameters to zero.
We evaluate classification performance and encoding per-
formance on pruned model on CIFAR10 with VGG and
ResNet. We set percentage of pruned parameters to be 10%,
30%, 50%, 70% and 90%. Plots on the left in Figure 3 sum-
marizes the results. Membership encoding can achieve near
0.70 precision when the pruned percentage is 30%. When
the pruned percentage increases, both encoding performance
and test classification accuracy drop.
Transfer learning. Another common practice in ML is
transfer learning: client trains a model for one task and later
on uses the model for a different task. The most popular way
to perform transfer learning is to use the trained model as a
feature extractor by replacing the output layer for the new
task and then fine-tune the spliced model on a new dataset.
We evaluate our encoding performance on models trained
on CIFAR10 and then fine-tuned on a different dataset, STL-
102. STL-10 is a similar dataset as CIFAR10 but with dif-
ferent objects and class labels (Coates, Ng, and Lee 2011).
Each image is 96 × 96 in size and has three channels and
there are in total 5,000 training images and 800 testing im-
ages. In order for STL-10 to be used as input for models
trained on CIFAR10, we resize each image to 32 × 32 in
size. We use the trained VGG and ResNet models as the fea-
ture extractors and fine-tune the models for 60 epochs with
learning rate being 0.001. We evaluate the test performance
on STL-10 and encoding performance on CIFAR10 every
10 epochs. The results are shown in Figure 4. For both mod-
els, the encoding performance remains stable across number
of epochs which demonstrates that membership encoding is
robust against fine-tuning to a different task.
Related Work
Membership inference. Membership inference against ML
models has been studied in (Shokri et al. 2017; Rahman et
al. 2018; Long et al. 2018). The attack in (Shokri et al. 2017)
focuses black-box models, exploiting the differences in the
models’ outputs on training and non-training inputs. Their
attack performance is best when the target model fθ is over-
fitted on the training data. In membership encoding, on the
other hand, the trained models can be well-generalized and
yet leak membership information.
Followup work extends membership inference attack to
differential private ML model and shows that model needs
to sacrifice its test performance to achieve membership pri-
vacy (Rahman et al. 2018). Other work showed that well-
generalized model can leak membership information (Long
et al. 2018) . However, their attack first needs to identify vul-
nerable records which consist only handful of records in the
training set. Our encoded model leaks the membership for a
substantial subset of training data.
Memorization in ML. Zhang et al. showed that deep learn-
ing models can achieve perfect performance on training data
even the data are randomly generated. Followup work pre-
sented malicious training algorithms to force an ML model
that encodes the training data, which can be later extracted
with either white-box or black-box access to the model,
without affecting the accuracy of the model on its main
task (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). In their white-
box attacks, the information is embedded in the parameter θ
directly while our work encodes information in the hidden
activations or outputs. Their black-box attack uses synthetic
data to encode the training data in the output prediction.
However, to encode one lossy version of CIFAR10 image
for example, their attack needs 4,096 random data, limiting
their attack to encode only a couple of inputs.
Carlini et al. also showed deep learning-based generative
sequence models memorizes training text data unintention-
ally. Adversary can extract some specific inputs with black-
2https://cs.stanford.edu/ acoates/stl10/
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Figure 2: PCA and T-SNE projection of activations (white-box) and outputs (black-box) on CIFAR10 with VGG trained with
membership encoding. Pink circles are the projected activations and outputs ofDA-m, orange triangles are ofDA-nm, blue hollow
circles are of DC-m and gray hollow triangles are of DC-nm.
Model Masking w=4 w=8 w=12 w=16
mode pre rec AUC pre rec AUC pre rec AUC pre rec AUC
VGG white-box Center 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.88 0.67 0.89 0.79 0.27 0.71 0.69 0.12 0.60
VGG white-box Boundary 0.88 0.85 0.93 0.77 0.62 0.76 0.66 0.37 0.61 0.62 0.13 0.54
VGG black-box Center 0.92 0.52 0.91 0.91 0.20 0.82 0.88 0.02 0.67 0.91 0.01 0.58
VGG black-box Boundary 0.90 0.35 0.87 0.83 0.05 0.69 0.72 0.02 0.58 0.61 0.01 0.53
Table 4: Encoding results on masked CIFAR10 images. w is the width of masked region.
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Figure 3: Encoding results on pruned CIFAR10 VGG model.
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Figure 4: Encoding results on transferred CIFAR10 model.
box access to the model, given some prior knowledge about
the format of the input (e.g. credit card number).
Watermarking ML model. Recently there is a line of re-
search focusing on embedding watermarking information
into ML models to protect the model copyright (Chen, Ro-
hani, and Koushanfar 2018; Rouhani, Chen, and Koushan-
far 2018; Adi et al. 2018; Uchida et al. 2017). These
works develop methods that embedding the watermark in
the model parameters (Uchida et al. 2017), through model
prediction outputs on a trigger dataset (Adi et al. 2018) or
through model intermediate activations (Chen, Rohani, and
Koushanfar 2018; Rouhani, Chen, and Koushanfar 2018).
The embedded information in this case is usually a secret
binary string that is unique to the owner of the model, while
in our case the information is the membership of a subset of
training data.
Other privacy attack against ML. Ateniese et al. presented
an attack against ML model to infer the properties about
the training data, for example, whether a speech recogni-
tion model was trained only on data from Indian English
speakers.Melis et al. showed how an adversary participant
in a collaborative training of a ML model can infer the prop-
erties about other participants’ training data. Fredrikson et
al.; Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart developed model inver-
sion attack: given white-box or black-box access to a ML
model, adversary can construct a representative of a cer-
tain output class (e.g. a recognizable face when each class
corresponds to a single person). Hitaj, Ateniese, and Pe´rez-
Cruz extends the idea to collaborative training setting, where
an adversary participant can use generative adversarial net-
works (Goodfellow et al. 2014) to infer class representatives.
In opposition to above attacks, membership encoding
aims to encode and infer the exact membership information
for a subset of training set rather than some properties of a
class or a subgroup in the training data.
Conclusion
We presented membership encoding that forces deep learn-
ing model to learn distinguishable representation for a sub-
stantial fraction of training data with negligible loss in test
accuracy. Our experimental results showed that one can per-
form accurate membership inference on target data records
even if the input data is redacted or the trained model is
being modified. Our encoding mechanism can be used for
watermarking for copyright protection as well as inferring
membership of sensitive training data.
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Supplementary material for: Membership Encoding for Deep Learning
Datasets
Purchase. Our purchase dataset is extracted from Kag-
gle’s “acquire valued shoppers” challenge dataset3. The raw
dataset contains shopping histories for thousands of cus-
tomers. For our experiments, we processed the dataset as
described in (Shokri et al. 2017) where each record consists
of 600 binary features. Each feature corresponds to a prod-
uct and represents whether the user has purchased it or not.
We cluster the records into 5 group, each representing a dif-
ferent purchase style, and use the cluster label as target label
classification. We split the data so that the training set has
150,000 records and test set has 30,000.
Texas hospital. This dataset contains the patients discharge
data with information about inpatients stays released by the
Texas Department of State Health Services. Each patient’s
record contains attributes such as the external causes of in-
jury, the diagnosis, the procedures the patient underwent and
some meta information about the patient. We encode these
fields into 6, 170 binary features following (Shokri et al.
2017). The processed dataset has 60,000 records and we use
50,000 for training and 10,000 for testing. We cluster the
data into 10 groups and use the cluster label as the class la-
bel.
MNIST is a handwritten digit recognition dataset consisting
of 70,000 images4. Each class (0 to 9) has 7,000 images.
Each image is 28 × 28 in size and gray-scaled. We use the
50,000 of them for training and the rest 20,000 for testing.
CIFAR10 is an object classification dataset with 50,000
training images and 10,000 test images (Krizhevsky 2009).
There are in total 10 categories and 6,000 images per cate-
gory. Each image has 32× 32 pixels, each pixel has 3 values
corresponding to RGB intensities.
ML Models
Multi-layer perceptron (MLP). Each layer in MLP maps
previous layer’s output to a hidden states through a linear
projection and a non-linear activation function. We use a
two-layer MLP for Purchase, Texas and MNIST dataset and
ReLU as the activation function.
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) consists of con-
volutional layers as building blocks. Each convolutional
layer is a non-linear convolution operation that can capture
spatial-invariant features in an image (LeCun et al. 1998).
The filters in these convolution operations are the parame-
ters to be learned. For MNSIT dataset, we use a CNN with
two convolutional layers and max pooling layers followed
by two fully connected layers. For CIFAR10, we use a 9-
layer VGG style CNN and the detail architecture can be
3https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-
challenge/data
4http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
found in (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014).
Residual networks (ResNet) is a recently proposed network
architecture and dominates many computer vision task (He
et al. 2016). ResNet solves the gradient vanishing prob-
lem happened during optimizing very deep CNNs by adding
identity mappings from lower layers to higher layers. We use
a 32-layer residual network for CIFAR10.
Hyper-parameter setup. On all dataset, we randomly select
20% of training data for encoding membership. We generate
1,000 synthetic data with 500 being encoded as member and
rest 500 encoded as nonmember. We training the discrimi-
nator MLP at inference time for 80 epochs with momentum
SGD and learning rate 0.001.
For Purchase dataset, we use a two layer MLP with 256
and 128 hidden units for the two layers. For Texas dataset,
we use a larger MLP with 1024 and 256 hidden units. For
both Purchase and Texas, we train the model with momen-
tum SGD and set learning rate to be 0.02 for the main model
and 0.01 for the discriminator. We train the model for 80
epochs and decay the learning by a factor of 10 at epoch 60.
We randomly select 50% of hidden units in the second layer
for encoding.
For MNIST dataset, we experiment with both MLP and
CNN. We use two-layer MLP with 512 and 128 hidden units.
For CNN, we use 64 filters of size 5× 5 in the first convolu-
tion layer and 128 filters of size 5 × 5 in the second and the
convolution layers are followed by a fully connected layer
with 256 hidden units. For both MLP and CNN, we use mo-
mentum SGD with learning being 0.02 for both main model
and discriminator. We train the model for 100 epochs and
decay the learning by a factor of 10 at epoch 80. We ran-
domly select 50% of hidden units in the last fully connected
layer in both MLP and CNN for encoding.
For CIFAR10 dataset, we use VGG and ResNet. For both
models, we use momentum SGD with learning being 0.02
for main model and 0.01 for discriminator. We train the
model for 80 epochs and decay both learning rates by a fac-
tor of 10 at epoch 40 and 60. For encoding, we randomly se-
lect 20% of hidden units in the second to last convolutional
layer for VGG and second to last residual block for ResNet.
Additional Experiments
Loss trajectory of membership encoding. Figure 5 shows
trajectories of the classification loss on member, nonmem-
ber and test data as well as discriminator loss. Counter-
intuitively, the classification task and encoding task con-
verges without conflicting each other during training as
both losses Lce, Lenc converged simultaneously. The plot
also shows that our white-box encoding does not cause
overfitting in the membership dataset as the classifica-
tion loss for both members and nonmembers converged to
the same point. For black-box encoding, both test classifi-
cation loss and discriminator encoding loss converge as are
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Figure 5: Loss trajectory during training of CIFAR10 dataset
with VGG and ResNet. The x-axis is the epoch of training
and y-axis is the loss value.
the cases in white-box encoding. However, the classification
loss on nonmember data is lower then that on member data.
This suggests that black-box encoding biased the outputs on
members data, and as a result loss convergence is affected
subtly.
Effects of number of encoded data. We also study how en-
coding performance affected by increasing amount of data
to be encoded in a fixed size model. We evaluate the per-
formance on Purchase and CIFAR10 with VGG. We start
from training model with encoding 20% of the training data
and increase the amount of encoded data by 5,000 gradually
and evaluate the encoding performance in each of the trained
model.
Table 5 summarizes the results. On both Purchase and CI-
FAR10, we observe a decreasing trends in encoding perfor-
mance while the model’s test performance remains the same
as the baseline model. The encoding performance is still rel-
Purchase Test Enc Enc Enc
|DC-m| acc pre rec AUC
30K 98.42% 0.85 1.00 0.94
35K 98.34% 0.83 1.00 0.91
40K 98.48% 0.83 0.98 0.88
45K 98.38% 0.80 0.86 0.82
50K 98.54% 0.79 0.90 0.79
55K 98.56% 0.64 0.67 0.50
CIFAR10 Test Enc Enc Enc
|DC-m| acc pre rec AUC
10K 89.67% 0.92 0.98 0.98
15K 88.77% 0.91 0.98 0.96
20K 88.97% 0.85 1.00 0.93
25K 88.59% 0.84 1.00 0.88
30K 88.86% 0.84 0.99 0.84
35K 89.30% 0.83 0.99 0.77
Table 5: The effects of number of data encoded on test and
encoding performance evaluated on Purchase and CIFAR10
with VGG.
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Figure 6: Encoding results on adversarially pruned CI-
FAR10 VGG model.
atively high on CIFAR10 when the number of encoded data
is 50% of the training set while encoding performance drops
much quicker on Purchase. This might be due to the larger
capacity and the more flexible representation in VGG net-
work than MLP.
Adversarial pruning. Pruning, as described in Robust Anal-
ysis section, affects the main tasks classification accuracy,
it is common to fine-tune the pruned model on the original
dataset. We develop an adversarial pruning algorithm that
preserve the membership information encoded in the pruned
model. In the scenarios of privacy attacks, client might need
the expertise to perform pruning with fine-tuning as in the
case for training the model and thus the code for pruning
could be supplied by the adversary.
The adversarial pruning algorithm is similar to member-
ship encoding: we first select p% smallest parameters in a
maliciously trained model and set them to 0. We then aug-
ments the pruned model with a freshly initialized member-
ship discriminator. He then fine-tunes the pruned model and
the discriminator with client’s data and auxiliary synthe-
sized data as in Function MembershipEncoding of Al-
gorithm 1. During update the classifier parameters θ, the gra-
dients for the pruned parameters are set to zeros so that the
fine-tuned model remains pruned.
We evaluate the adversarial model pruning on CIFAR10
dataset with VGG. We fine-tune the pruned model for 20
epochs and set the learning rate to be 0.001. The results on
the fine-tuned models are shown in plots on the right in Fig-
ure 6. There is almost no loss in test accuracy and minor
drop in encoding performance even when 70% of the model
parameters are set to zero.
Advanced Privacy Attacks with
Membership Encoding
In this section, we describe some of the advanced privacy
attacks using membership encoding: reconstruction attack,
a hybrid attack with prior attacks (Song, Ristenpart, and
Shmatikov 2017).
Reconstruction attack. The attacker aims at reconstruct-
ing a data record which is partially known to him. The at-
tacker might have some auxiliary information about the data
as well. For example, The adversary might know a DNA
sequence with missing sub-sequences, and in addition he
knows the candidate sub-sequences. Adversary can utilize
the membership inference attack to perform this reconstruc-
tion. Adversary can query with membership discriminator
with all probable combination of the full record. The one
which receives highest confidence to be classified as mem-
ber is the reconstructed record. Given the high accuracy of
our attack, even in the case of missing data, it can be used to
perform accurate reconstruction attacks.
Hybrid attack. Our membership encoding attack can be
composed with previous embedding attack to form a
stronger attack. Prior work proposed several ways of encod-
ing the exact bits of data record into a ML model while the
number of records that can be embedded is limited to a few
hundreds for white-box and a dozen records for black-box
setting, due to the limited capacity of the model (Song, Ris-
tenpart, and Shmatikov 2017).
In reality, not all bits for a data record are sensitive.
Adversary can utilize our membership encoding attack to
scale up the embedding attack. For each record that adver-
sary wishes to embed, he splits the record into sensitive at-
tributes and nonsensitive attributes. Adversary then encodes
the membership information for these records of interest, us-
ing our algorithm, and embeds their sensitive attributes and
a compressed version of the nonsensitive attributes (e.g. a
short hash) using large data embedding methods (Song, Ris-
tenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). During the decoding (infer-
ence) phase, given a redacted input x′ with only nonsensitive
attributes, adversary first verifies whether x′ is encoded as
member. Our attack is very accurate on partial data. If it has
been a member, the adversary proceeds to compute the com-
pressed version of x′ and finds the corresponding embedded
sensitive attributes, using the decoder (Song, Ristenpart, and
Shmatikov 2017). The major advantage of the hybrid attack
is that adversary can use membership encoding to rule out
the possible collisions in matching the compressed nonsen-
sitive attribute. In addition, since embedded information for
each record is compressed, the model can thus leak informa-
tion for a large set of records.
